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ABSTRACT: In Australia, most prescription drugs are subsidized through the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme (PBS), one of several government programs in which evidence-based 
decision making is applied to the funding of health technologies. PBS processes are 
intended to ensure “value for money” for the Australian taxpayer and to support affordable, 
equitable access to prescription medicines; they are not intended as a mechanism for cost 
containment. The inclusion of a drug on the national formulary depends on the 
recommendation of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC), which 
considers not only the comparative effectiveness but also the comparative cost-effectiveness 
of drugs proposed for listing. While some decisions have been controversial, the PBS 
retains strong public support. Moreover, evidence does not suggest that the consideration 
of cost-effectiveness has created a negative environment for the drug industry: Australia 
has a high penetration of patented medicines, with prices for some recently approved drugs 
at U.S. levels. 
                    
OVERVIEW
Australia has a comprehensive system of universal health insurance coverage for 
both outpatient and hospital services called Medicare. Non-hospital services are 
funded mainly on a fee-for-service basis, while free access to public hospitals is 
supported by grants to state and territorial governments. Most prescription drugs 
are subsidized through the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), one of sev-
eral government programs in which evidence-based decision making is applied 
to the funding of health technologies.1 This paper focuses on the PBS, which 
nearly 20 years ago became the first of these programs to introduce evidence-
based health technology assessment.
Australia’s PBS subsidizes most outpatient prescription drugs. The inclu-
sion of a drug on the national formulary is dependent on the recommendation of 
the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC). Since the early 
To download this publication and  
learn about others as they become 
available, visit us online at  
www.commonwealthfund.org and  
register to receive Fund e-Alerts. 
Commonwealth Fund pub. 1297 
Vol. 60
The mission of The Commonwealth 
Fund is to promote a high performance 
health care system. The Fund carries 
out this mandate by supporting 
independent research on health care 
issues and making grants to improve 
health care practice and policy. Support 
for this research was provided by 
The Commonwealth Fund. The views 
presented here are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of The 
Commonwealth Fund or its directors, 
officers, or staff.
For more information about this study, 
please contact:




Australian Department of Health 
and Ageing
ruth.lopert@health.gov.au
2 the commonweaLth Fund
1990s, the PBAC has considered not only the compar-
ative effectiveness, but also the comparative cost-
effectiveness of drugs proposed for PBS listing.
The PBAC is an independent statutory commit-
tee, appointed by the Health Minister; the cost of run-
ning its listing process is about US$10 million per 
year. The PBAC generally does not set its own work 
agenda, but reviews applications (usually submitted by 
manufacturers) for the listing of new drugs or of addi-
tional uses of already-listed drugs. Evidence submitted 
by the applicant is evaluated by staff of the 
Department of Health, assisted by contracted academic 
groups. While there is a preference for evidence from 
randomized controlled trials directly comparing a new 
drug with the drug or treatment it is mostly likely to 
replace, other evidence (indirect comparisons, nonran-
domized studies) is weighed on a case-by-case basis. 
Based on the evidence and the evaluation, the 
PBAC may recommend an unrestricted listing on the 
formulary, or listing for specified indications only, and 
in some cases may require prior authorization to pre-
scribe. There is no specific cost-effectiveness threshold 
for approval; a higher cost-effectiveness ratio may be 
considered acceptable in relation to a drug for the 
treatment of a life-threatening condition for which 
there is a lack of effective alternative treatments, 
whereas a drug with a more modest incremental cost 
relative to its projected improvement in health out-
comes may not be recommended if there is significant 
uncertainty in the estimate of cost-effectiveness. A 
drug that has not been recommended by the PBAC 
cannot be added to the PBS formulary, but the Health 
Minister may choose not to list a recommended drug.
While some PBAC decisions have been 
controversial—particularly decisions not to 
recommend the listing of certain oncology 
medicines—the PBS retains strong public support. 
Moreover, evidence does not suggest that the “fourth 
hurdle” of cost-effectiveness in drug approval has 
created a negative environment for the drug industry: 
Australia has a high penetration of patented medicines, 
prices for some recently approved drugs are at U.S. 
levels, and overall PBS spending rose 11 percent a 
year during the period 1996–97 to 2004–05. 
Importantly, the PBS processes are intended to ensure 
value for money for the Australian taxpayer and to 
support affordable, equitable access to prescription 
medicines for all Australians, and are not intended as a 
mechanism for cost containment. 
BACkgROunD: ThE PhARMACEuTICAl 
BEnEfITS SChEME AnD PhARMACEuTICAl 
BEnEfITS ADVISORy COMMITTEE
The PBS has its origins as far back as 1919, when a 
limited program was established to provide subsidized 
medicines to World War I veterans and their families. 
When the PBS was formally established in 1948, it 
covered all drugs for pensioners and 139 “life saving 
and disease preventing” drugs for everyone else.2 Since 
then it has evolved into a formulary of more than 
3,500 different items. The list of benefits is compre-
hensive, covering most medical conditions for which 
drug therapy is appropriate.
It is estimated that around 80 percent of all 
prescriptions dispensed in Australia are subsidized 
under the PBS. Most PBS prescriptions are dispensed 
through community pharmacies, but PBS subsidies are 
also available to patients in private hospitals and 
people in residential care facilities. The federal 
government also subsidizes certain high-cost drugs 
supplied to hospital outpatients. Drugs supplied to 
public-hospital inpatients are, like other care in these 
facilities, generally the responsibility of state and 
territorial governments. 
Under the PBS, beneficiaries fall into one of 
two categories that determine the amount patients con-
tribute towards the cost of their medicines. In 2009, 
general beneficiaries contribute a maximum copay-
ment of AUS$32.90 (about US$24) per item, while 
concessional beneficiaries—people who receive cer-
tain pensions and benefits or who meet certain criteria 
for being declared to be disadvantaged—pay 
AUS$5.30 (about US$4) per item, and the PBS pays 
the balance, up to the listed price. Safety-net (stop-
loss) arrangements, which reduce the amount payable 
when a specified threshold is reached within a calen-
dar year, limit patients’ out of pocket expenses.3 
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Copayment amounts are adjusted on January 1 of each 
year, in line with movement in the consumer price 
index. Copayments contribute around 15 percent of 
total government expenditures in the program.4
In the early 1990s, amid concern over rising 
costs, the PBS became the first national pharmaceuti-
cal reimbursement program to introduce an explicit 
consideration of “value for money” as a prerequisite 
for formulary listing. Before a drug may be added to 
the PBS formulary, it must first be registered for sale 
in Australia. As with other nations’ regulatory pro-
cesses for drugs, this involves an assessment of effi-
cacy, safety, and quality. Once it has marketing 
approval, a drug may be dispensed as a private pre-
scription, with the patient paying the full cost (which 
may be offset by a contribution from the patient’s pri-
vate health insurance). To be covered under the PBS, 
however, a drug must meet an additional criterion—
the fourth hurdle of cost-effectiveness.
Submissions seeking the listing of new medi-
cines on the PBS (or for making changes to existing 
listings) are considered by the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Advisory Committee. The PBAC is a statutory inde-
pendent expert committee established under the 
National Health Act of 1953 (the Act) to make recom-
mendations to the Minister for Health and Ageing on 
which medicines should be included on the schedule 
of pharmaceutical benefits and any conditions that 
should apply. A 1987 amendment to the legislation 
requires that when considering a proposal for the list-
ing of a new medicine on the PBS formulary, the 
PBAC must take into account the effectiveness and 
cost of a medicine compared with other drug (or non-
drug) therapies.5 
A medicine that is more costly than other avail-
able treatments is generally only recommended for 
subsidy if it provides a clinically significant improve-
ment in effectiveness or reduction in toxicity. The 
evaluation and decision-making process are sometimes 
referred to as “making a decision at the margin”—
assessing the costs and benefits of replacing an exist-
ing treatment with the treatment proposed. In essence, 
the process may be thought of conceptually as one of 
“purchasing outcomes” rather than drugs, in that 
unless a new medicine offers an additional clinical 
benefit (improved outcome) relative to current alterna-
tives, it will not be listed at a higher price (i.e., receive 
a higher subsidy). 
POlICy fRAMEWORk, PRInCIPlES,  
AnD OBjECTIVES
The PBS operates under the umbrella of Australia’s 
National Medicines Policy, which has as its overall 
aim “to meet medication and related service needs,  
so that both optimal health outcomes and economic 
objectives are achieved.”6 The policy has four  
central pillars:
medicines meeting appropriate standards of •	
quality, safety, and efficacy;
timely access to the medicines that Australians •	
need, at a cost individuals and the community 
can afford;
the quality use of medicines; and•	
the maintenance of a responsible and viable •	
drug industry.
The PBS facilitates access to prescription medi-
cines by subsidizing their costs, reflecting the premise 
that cost should not constitute a substantial barrier to 
people’s access to medicines they need. Recognizing 
such subsidies are not costless to society—and the 
community as a whole must bear them—the National 
Medicines Policy is premised in part on the under-
standing that consumers should be encouraged to 
understand the costs, benefits, and risks of medicines, 
and that access should be supported by rational use. 
While the PBS is a demand-driven program 
with an uncapped appropriation, the introduction of 
cost-effectiveness evaluation as a prerequisite for for-
mulary listing was not intended as a cost-containment 
mechanism per se, but rather as a way of ensuring that 
drugs added to the national formulary reflect value  
for money. 
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The PBAC has no explicit role in the develop-
ment or promulgation of clinical guidelines. However, 
the PBAC often has an important, albeit indirect, influ-
ence on clinical practice. When recommending the list-
ing of a medicine on the PBS, the PBAC may limit the 
indications for which the subsidy applies or may 
require the use of a “stepped therapy” or prior treatment 
algorithm, or, rarely, apply a “continuation rule”— a 
requirement that a patient demonstrate a response to 
treatment—as a prerequisite for access to ongoing sub-
sidized therapy. This is intended to ensure that the use 
of the medication is consistent with the context in 
which it has been shown to be cost-effective.
The PBAC’s remit was expanded in 2006 to 
include responsibility for the evaluation of vaccines 
for funding under the National Immunisation Program. 
The principles of evaluation that are applied to vac-
cines are the same as those applied to drugs proposed 
for listing on the PBS.
STRuCTuRE AnD SIzE, POSITIOnIng,  
AnD OuTPuTS 
The PBAC is an independent, statutory committee of 
up to 18 members, with membership of at least one 
each of the following: consumer, health economist, 
practicing community pharmacist, general practitioner, 
clinical pharmacologist; and medical specialist. The 
remaining members must have qualifications or expe-
rience in a field relevant to the functions of the com-
mittee. The PBAC chair is a full-time position, with all 
other members being part-time. All members are 
appointed by the Minister of Health and Ageing and 
serve “at the Minister’s pleasure.” The PBAC meets 
up to six times a year, with three three-day-long meetings 
devoted to the consideration of listing submissions; 
these occur at 17-week intervals. In between these 
meetings, other, shorter meetings are held as necessary 
to consider methodological issues and matters of policy 
and procedure. 
The PBAC is also supported in its work by two 
technical subcommittees: 
The Drug Utilisation Sub-Committee, which •	
monitors the patterns and trends of drug use and 
evaluates use and financial forecasts in selected 
major submissions to PBAC. Its members have 
a broad range of relevant expertise and mainly 
come from organizations interested in the evalu-
ation of drug utilization; 
The Economics Sub-Committee, which •	
evaluates the cost-effectiveness of major 
submissions to PBAC, by reviewing and 
interpreting economic analyses and assessing 
their quality, validity, and relevance. Its 
members include clinicians, clinical 
epidemiologists, health economists, 
biostatisticians, and clinical pharmacologists. 
Submissions to list new drugs or to make sub-
stantial changes to existing listings are considered 
major submissions. Examples include submissions 
Role of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
Recommends drugs and medicinal preparations to the Minister for Health for funding under the •	
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). 
Recommends vaccines for funding under the National Immunisation Program (since 2006). •	
Advises the minister and the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority about cost-effectiveness •	
(“value for money”). 
Recommends maximum quantities and repeats on the basis of community use, and any restrictions on •	
the indications where the PBS subsidy is available. 
Regularly reviews the list of PBS items. •	
Advises the minister about any other matters relating to the PBS. •	
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that: substantially change the listing of a currently 
restricted drug (adding a new indication or broadening 
the eligibility criteria of an existing listing); review the 
comparative cost-effectiveness of a currently listed 
drug in order to change a PBAC recommendation on 
its therapeutic relativity, or support a price premium 
over a comparator; or list a new form (or strength) of a 
currently listed drug for which a price advantage is 
requested. Minor submissions are those that do not 
require the presentation of an economic evaluation.
In 2007, the PBAC considered a total of 209 
submissions—122 minor and 87 major. Of these, 151 
(72%) were recommended, 45 (22%) were not recom-
mended, 12 (6%) were deferred, and one was with-
drawn. The number of submissions has been growing 
steadily, with an increase of around 40 percent in both 
major and minor submissions over the last three 
years.7
The PBS program is administered by the 
Pharmaceutical Evaluation Branch (PEB), which is 
one of four branches of the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Division of the Department of Health and Ageing. The 
PEB houses the secretariats of the PBAC and its sub-
committees, as well as a section that manages price 
negotiations and provides secretariat support to the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority.8 The PEB 
has about 80 staff in total, with the cost of running the 
PBAC listing process estimated at AUS$14 million per 
annum (about US$10 million) in 2009–10.9 
uSIng COMPARATIVE EffECTIVEnESS 
RESEARCh TO InfORM POlICy DECISIOnS
The recommendations of the PBAC are advisory only, 
and the final decision to list remains with the Minister 
for Health and Ageing. However, while the Minister 
may decline a positive listing recommendation made 
by the PBAC,10 she may not add a medicine to the 
PBS formulary in the absence of a positive recommen-
dation from the committee. Further, if the net cost of 
the addition of a new medicine to the PBS formulary 
is expected to exceed a certain threshold (after taking 
into account projected cost offsets, such as reduction 
in expenditures on medications likely to be substituted 
in practice), the decision to list also requires the 
endorsement of the Cabinet. Failure to list a drug rec-
ommended by the PBAC has occurred only rarely.
The PBAC’s agenda and workload, and the tim-
ing of consideration of particular medicines, are gener-
ally determined by the filing of submissions by medi-
cines’ sponsors (or other entities). From time to time, 
however, the PBAC will undertake reviews of particu-
lar drugs or classes of drugs to consider specific issues 
of concern.
Drug Application Process and Timelines
An applicant seeking the listing of a medicine on the 
PBS is required to submit an application prepared in 
accordance with detailed guidelines. The PBAC guide-
lines are revised continuously to maintain their meth-
odological currency and to incorporate feedback from 
users. The most recent revision was published in 
December 2008.11 
The PBAC evaluation cycle is fixed at 17 
weeks, and the committee considers submissions three 
times a year (in March, July, and November). The cut-
off for filing of major submissions (i.e., those requir-
ing an economic evaluation) is 17 weeks prior to the 
meeting. To ensure timeliness of the process and avoid 
undue delays in facilitating access for patients, all sub-
missions submitted by the cutoff are considered at the 
PBAC’s immediately following meeting. 
The cycle begins with the submission of the 
application by the sponsor and the preparation of a 
detailed commentary on the clinical and economic 
evidence presented in the submission. This is then 
provided to the sponsor for comment, and the 
submission, the commentary, and the sponsor’s 
response are provided to the Economics Sub-
Committee and Drug Utilisation Sub-Committee, 
which meet about four weeks before the PBAC meets. 
The outcomes of the subcommittee meetings are 
advice to the PBAC; these documents are also sent to 
sponsors for comment. All these documents—the 
submission, the commentary, the subcommittees’ 
advice, and the responses from the sponsor—are 
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considered by PBAC in the 17th week, at which time 
the PBAC makes a decision to recommend or reject 
the application, or (uncommonly) to defer the decision 
pending clarification of a specific issue.
Positive listing recommendations by the PBAC 
are advisory only, however, with the government mak-
ing the final decision as to whether and when to list. 
Broadly, for positive listing recommendations, a rec-
ommendation by the PBAC for listing of a product, or 
the extension of the terms of an existing listing, is 
referred to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing 
Authority, which provides advice regarding negotia-
tion of an appropriate price by departmental officers, if 
required. The PBAC and pricing authority’s recom-
mendations are then referred to the Minister for Health 
and Ageing for decision. Where a proposed listing is 
expected to add $10 million or more per annum in net 
cost to the PBS, it must be endorsed by the Cabinet. 
If the PBAC rejects an application, the sponsor 
may resubmit it to a subsequent meeting of the com-
mittee (with amendments or new evidence) or, for sub-
missions seeking the listing of a new medicine or new 
indication, may seek an independent review.
Evidence Synthesis and Evaluation
The PBAC is a user rather than a producer of CER. 
Formulary listing decisions can be conceptualized as 
attempting to address the question: What are the costs 
and benefits of substituting an existing drug (or other 
treatment modality) most likely to be replaced in prac-
tice, with the drug being proposed for listing for the 
proposed indication? Thus, the analysis is inherently 
comparative, and the nature and scope of the relevant 
evidence are critically determined by the use/indica-
tion proposed, which then determines the scope of the 
evidence relevant to answering the key question. 
Importantly, the evidence presented to the com-
mittee to support an application for listing is identi-
fied, collated, and presented by the applicant—usually 
(but not always) a pharmaceutical company. Detailed 
reviews of applications are undertaken on behalf of the 
Department of Health by a network of academic insti-
tutions individually contracted to undertake 
evaluations of submissions for the listing of medicines 
on the PBS.
The PBAC evaluation processes are evidence-
based, scientifically rigorous, and methodologically 
current. The PBAC does not apply a minimum stan-
dard of evidence. Evidence from direct (head-to-head) 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of the proposed 
drug against the main comparator is generally most 
persuasive; while there is no minimum standard of evi-
dence—and a submission is not rejected if it fails to 
present randomized data—the interpretation of the evi-
dence is often more difficult for sponsors, evaluators, 
and decision-makers alike. Unlike conventional evi-
dentiary hierarchies, the PBAC’s preference, in the 
absence of one or more direct head-to-head RCTs, is to 
compare two sets of trials where each alternative is 
randomized with a common reference, such as a pla-
cebo (or active common comparator). Overall, the 
pragmatic position has been not to set a minimum 
standard, but rather to allow an experienced evaluation 
and committee process to weigh the acceptability of 
less-preferred evidence on a case-by-case basis.
Decision-Making
The PBAC does not apply a set of simple decision 
rules, but rather weighs a range of relevant factors in 
its considerations. In particular, the PBAC does not 
apply a fixed threshold when determining acceptable 
cost-effectiveness. The PBAC chair is on record as 
saying that PBAC considers that an incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio greater than AUS$50,000 per qual-
ity-adjusted life year would to be “on the high side.” 
Nevertheless, the committee has declined to recom-
mend the listing of drugs with lower cost-effectiveness 
ratios and recommended the listing of others with con-
siderably higher ratios. This is because, in addition to 
acceptable incremental cost-effectiveness, there are 
several other factors that the PBAC has identified as 
informing its decision-making. These include: 
Clinical need, particularly for those conditions •	
for which there are no, or few, alternative treat-
ment options, and the extent to which the 
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proposed treatment reflects a clinically mean-
ingful advance in therapy.
The degree of uncertainty in the estimate of •	
incremental cost-effectiveness. This is a particu-
larly difficult area, as it is not uncommon to see 
a drug with an ICER with a reasonable point 
estimate but with a very wide confidence inter-
val. This may reflect a weakness in the clinical 
trial data, difficulty in measuring or valuing the 
difference in effect, or uncertainty arising (usu-
ally) from a modeled economic evaluation, as 
reflected in modeled sensitivity analyses.
The potential total cost to the PBS and/or •	
Government health budgets.
The scope for use of the drug beyond any •	
restriction for subsidy, and the extent to which a 
restriction can be constructed that satisfactorily 
distinguishes use that is acceptably cost-effec-
tive from use that is not cost-effective.
The potential for adverse outcomes arising from •	
availability with subsidy (e.g., PBAC may 
restrict subsidized use of certain antibiotics to 
limit the development of resistant organisms). 
The affordability of the medicine to the patient •	
in the absence of a subsidy.
The “rule of rescue”—reserved for drugs for •	
serious or fatal diseases for which no other 
treatments are available. 
These individual factors are not weighted 
equally by the PBAC in its decision-making process 
and will be of greater or lesser importance in different 
situations. For that reason, the importance of any par-
ticular factor cannot be quantified. 
The PBAC may recommend listing of a medi-
cine on the PBS as an unrestricted benefit, which has 
no restrictions on its subsidized therapeutic use. Or, it 
may a recommend a “restricted” benefit, under which 
the medicine may be prescribed only for specific ther-
apeutic uses, or an “authority required” benefit, under 
which the medicine requires prior authorization. These 
requirements may be imposed to:
limit PBS usage to the approved indications;•	
allow the controlled introduction of a drug in a •	
new therapeutic class;
limit PBS usage to the indications, conditions, •	
or settings seen as being appropriate for clini-
cal, cost-effectiveness, or other reasons; or
alleviate concerns about adverse reactions, •	
possible misuse, overuse, or abuse. 
Transparency
Until relatively recently, both the existence and content 
of PBAC submissions were treated as confidential and 
only limited information about PBAC recommenda-
tions was released. In October 2005, the first detailed 
accounts of the PBAC’s deliberations, including 
descriptions of the evidence considered by the com-
mittee, were published on the Department of Health 
and Ageing’s Web site in the form of Public Summary 
Documents.12 These are developed from the PBAC 
minutes, presented in a standardized format, with some 
limited redactions. In September 2008, the PBAC 
agenda for the forthcoming November 2008 meeting 
was published for the first time, with an invitation for 
public comment.13
The provision of information to prescribers 
about comparative effectiveness and cost-effectiveness 
is critical to rational prescribing and achieving cost-
effective use in practice. It also imposes a greater 
degree of accountability on all parties and is resource 
intensive. It is hoped that greater transparency will 
give rise to more informed debate about the PBS and 
the challenges of maintaining affordable access to 
medicines for the whole community.
Review and Appeal
PBAC recommendations are not subject to appeal or 
merits review.14 Sponsors may make a resubmission to 
PBAC if a previous application has failed to result in a 
listing recommendation, or if the sponsor wishes to 
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broaden the subsidized indications or vary the listing 
restriction. However, where no new evidence or analy-
sis is available, a sponsor whose application for the 
listing of a medicine or new indication has been 
rejected by the PBAC may seek an independent 
review.15 A review is based on information which has 
already been presented to the PBAC, and no new 
information or evidence beyond that presented to the 
PBAC may be considered. In seeking an independent 
review, applicants must identify the issue(s) in dispute 
on which review is sought, and these must reflect the 
PBAC’s reasons for rejecting the application. 
An independent review is generally conducted 
by a single expert reviewer, whose findings, together 
with any comments by the sponsor, are presented to 
the PBAC for consideration. The PBAC is required to 
consider the findings of the review and determine 
whether they warrant reconsideration of the applica-
tion. If the PBAC reconsiders the application, it may 
set aside, revise, or confirm its previous recommenda-
tion. (There have been only two completed indepen-
dent reviews since this option was made available in 
2005.16)
Conflict of Interest Policies
No conflicts of interests are acceptable in the case of 
members of the PBAC and its subcommittees, or 
among staff of external evaluation groups. Committee 
members are required to lodge annual conflict-of-inter-
est declarations and make such declarations at each 
meeting. External evaluation groups are also required 
to be free of potential conflicts of interest arising from 
other sources of funding. 
ThE MEDIA AnD PuBlIC PERCEPTIOnS Of 
ThE PBS AnD PBAC
The PBS and PBAC are frequently the subject of pub-
lic and media attention. Most often controversial are 
the listing recommendations of the PBAC, both posi-
tive and negative, but significant comment is also 
directed at the time taken for drugs to be listed, the 
prices of PBS-listed medicines, and the magnitude and 
affordability of copayments. 
Specific decisions by the PBAC to reject and, at 
times, to recommend the listing of specific therapies 
can engender strong public, prescriber, industry, and 
media responses.17 Frequently cited examples include 
the PBAC’s 1998 decision to reject the listing of 
Viagra, in part due to concerns over the likely extent 
of use and potential cost to the program, which led to 
litigation in the Federal Court. The sponsor claimed 
that the PBAC had overstepped its authority in not 
limiting its consideration to evidence of comparative 
safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness. The Court 
rejected this argument, a decision that was subse-
quently upheld on appeal.18 
Equally controversial was the PBAC’s decision 
in 2000 to reject the listing of trastuzumab (Herceptin) 
for women with HER-2 positive advanced metastatic 
breast cancer, on the basis of inadequate cost-effec-
tiveness. The government of the day, facing intense 
public pressure but unable to list the drug on the PBS 
in the absence of a positive recommendation, chose to 
sidestep the PBAC by establishing a separate 
“Herceptin Program” to fund the drug. 
Recommendations by the PBAC concerning the 
human papillomavirus vaccine Gardasil, Alimta (pem-
etrexed) for mesothelioma, and Velcade (bortezomib) 
for multiple myeloma, are other examples of decisions 
that have attracted significant comment.
Australia’s pursuit of a free-trade agreement 
with the United States in 2003–04 led to a period of 
significant public debate around the PBS. Throughout 
the negotiations, there was speculation in the media, 
and among academics and NGOs in particular, that the 
PBS would be targeted as a non-tariff barrier in the 
negotiations and was at risk of being compromised in 
exchange for better market access for Australian com-
modities. The public release of the agreed text in May 
2004 was met with allegations that the provisions of 
the Pharmaceuticals Annex of the agreement would 
undermine the fundamental listing and pricing pro-
cesses of the PBS and drive increases in the prices 
paid for PBS medicines. In fact, the specific obliga-
tions of the text refer only to timeliness, transparency, 
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and consultation in formulary listing processes and 
make no reference to pricing.19 
As the PBAC grapples with expensive biologi-
cals and end-of-life drugs, listing recommendations are 
not infrequently accompanied by closely specified 
PBS restrictions and, at times, stepped-therapy require-
ments. These often arise because drugs either lack 
robust evidence of a clinically important additional 
benefit over existing therapies (some because they 
have been studied only in placebo-controlled trials), or 
the incremental costs of obtaining those benefits are 
such that the drugs are cost-effective in only narrowly 
defined groups of patients. The PBAC, in attempting 
to facilitate access while at the same time ensuring 
value for money for the taxpayer, may thus recom-
mend that subsidized access be limited to last-line 
therapy, or be highly targeted, or in a small number of 
cases will require patients to demonstrate a response to 
treatment as a prerequisite for ongoing subsidized 
access. This highlights a key policy challenge: finding 
ways to continue expanding access to important new 
therapies, while at the same time maintaining cost-
effectiveness as a key criterion for listing and safe-
guarding the affordability and sustainability of the pro-
gram into the future. 
IMPACT On POlICy AnD PRACTICE
As the PBS enters its seventh decade, economic analy-
sis as a prerequisite for PBS formulary listing has been 
in use for more than 15 years, and the “Australian 
approach” has been applied to more than 1,200 sub-
missions. About half of the drugs currently on the PBS 
formulary have been listed on the basis of a pharmaco-
economic evaluation, and the proportion increases 
each year with the listing of new medicines. As noted 
above, the evidence-based economic evaluation frame-
work was not intended as a cost-containment mecha-
nism per se, but rather as a means of ensuring effi-
ciency and value for money. Indeed, average nominal 
growth in PBS expenditures was more than 11 percent 
per year in the period 1996–97 to 2004–05.20 
While there has been no formal evaluation of 
this fourth-hurdle system, the use of evidence and the 
assessment of comparative effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness are well accepted. This has been facili-
tated by a number of factors: the general availability of 
clinical trial evidence, in part reflecting the longstand-
ing regulatory requirements applied to pharmaceuti-
cals; a strong legislative basis for the role of the 
PBAC; and the availability, albeit limited, of relevant 
technical skills within the bureaucracy and Australian 
academic institutions.21 On the other hand, the process 
has sometimes been hampered by limited understand-
ing on the part of patients and prescribers, and occa-
sionally by opposition from sectors of industry. This 
lack of understanding may reflect in part the low lev-
els of transparency that prevailed until relatively 
recently. 
The PBS has been found to perform well in 
terms of the criteria of equity, efficiency, quality, and 
acceptability.22 In terms of acceptability, while many 
PBAC recommendations are considered controversial, 
the PBS itself has strong public support. Equity is sup-
ported by reducing financial barriers to access; effi-
ciency, by ensuring that all new drugs demonstrate 
cost-effectiveness prior to listing.23 This implies that, 
even where net program costs are increased through 
the listing of a new drug, the increased expenditure 
theoretically represents good value for money for the 
taxpayer, because the drug has first been established as 
cost-effective—through improvements in quality and/
or quantity of life, or by way of offsets in other areas 
of the heath sector or other government programs.
Of course, the extent of cost-effectiveness antic-
ipated at the time of listing may not be achieved in 
practice, for a variety of reasons. The benefits of treat-
ment may be more difficult to realize outside the clinical 
trial context, particularly in older, younger, or sicker 
patients. The estimate of cost-effectiveness may be 
subject to uncertainty because of limitations in the 
clinical trial evidence, or prescribing may occur out-
side the PBS restriction (which will generally reflect 
the limits of cost-effectiveness). Sometimes, this can 
be mitigated through risk-sharing mechanisms, such as 
price-volume agreements24 negotiated at the time a drug 
is listed, as well as through initiatives to promote 
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appropriate use of medicines once they are on  
the formulary. 
While the pharmaceutical industry has at times 
argued that the fourth-hurdle mechanism and its 
impact on prices is a disincentive to register and 
market new medicines in Australia, to date there has 
been no evidence to support this. It is widely believed 
that PBS drug prices are invariably significantly lower 
than those in the U.S., an observation that has been 
supported by a number of analyses over the years.25 
Yet for many new medicines, particularly biologicals, 
this is no longer the case.26 In fact, there is evidence to 
suggest that, for drugs that represent significant 
advances in therapy—true therapeutic innovations—
the prices paid in Australia are as high as in the U.S., 
and sometimes even higher, for biologics in 
particular.27
A 2005 study comparing the Australian pharma-
ceuticals industry and commercial environment with 
those of the U.S., the U.K., Germany, Japan, India, and 
Singapore ranked Australia second overall behind 
Singapore, with Australia scoring highly on many indi-
cators related to the industry skills pool, practices, and 
regulatory processes. The study found that, although 
the demand for pharmaceutical products in Australia is 
not strongly price elastic, the subsidization of pharma-
ceutical prices paid by consumers “almost certainly 
gives rise to higher sales volumes than would occur in 
the absence of the subsidy.” It also found that the 
establishment of the PBS has led to a higher penetra-
tion of patented pharmaceuticals than in other devel-
oped markets.28
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3 In 2008, the safety-net thresholds are AUS$290.00 (for 
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